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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PUBLIC EDUCATION-TEACHER
STRIKEs-The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the provi-
sion of the Public Employees Relations Act permitting public
school teachers to strike does not violate article III, section 14 of
the Pennsylvania Constitution which requires the General Assem-
bly to provide for a thorough and efficient system of public
education.
Reichley v. North Penn School District, 626 A.2d 123 (Pa. 1993).
In 1986, the North Penn School District ("School District") and
the North Penn Education Association ("Education Association")
attempted to reach a new collective bargaining agreement.' After
negotiations and mediation had failed to bring about a new agree-
ment, teachers and other employees represented by the Education
Association initiated a strike pursuant to section 1003 of the Pub-
lic Employees Relation Act ("PERA").'
In response to the strike, a number of students and parents
("Plaintiffs") filed suit in the Common Pleas Court of Montgomery
County against the School District, the Education Association, and
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.3 The Plaintiffs sought an in-
junction ordering that the teachers cease striking 4 and requested
that, insofar as it permitted teachers to strike, PERA be declared
unconstitutional.
8
The Education Association and the School District filed prelimi-
nary objections alleging that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear
the case and that the parents lacked standing to bring the action.
The Plaintiffs then moved that the Commonwealth be removed as
a defendant.' The court of common pleas ruled that while the
Commonwealth had been removed as a party to the action for in-
1. Reichley v. North Penn Sch. Dist., 626 A.2d 123, 125 (Pa. 1993).
2. Reichley, 626 A.2d at 125. Section 1003 permits public employees to strike after
they have first attempted collective bargaining, provided the strike does not create a clear
and present danger or threat to the health, safety or welfare of the public. 43 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 1101.101- 1101.2301 (1991).
3. Reichley, 626 A.2d at 125.
4. The teachers returned to work in compliance with an injunction granted at the
School District's request. Id. at n.1. The School District and the Education Association en-
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junctive relief, it remained an indispensable party to the action for!
declaratory relief.8 The court of common pleas dismissed the ac-
tion, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case and both
the parents and students lacked standing.' The Plaintiffs appealed
the ruling to the commonwealth court, which held that the Com-
monwealth was not an indispensable party, that the common pleas
court could exercise jurisdiction, and that the plaintiffs did in fact
have standing.'0 The commonwealth court remanded the case to
the common pleas court for trial." On remand, the common pleas
court held that PERA was unconstitutional to the extent that it
permitted strikes by public educators."2 The Education Association
appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which addressed
several issues to determine the constitutionality of PERA.
3
The court first addressed the issue of whether the matter of the
constitutionality of PERA was moot.'4 The Education Association,
citing Gulnac v. South Butler County Education Association," ar-
gued that the trial court erred in reaching the merits of the case
8. Reichley, 626 A.2d at 125.





13. Reichley, 626 A.2d at 125.
14. Id. A question is "moot" when it presents no actual controversy or where the
issues have ceased to exist. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1008 (6th ed. 1990).
The mootness doctrine arises from the cases and controversies requirement of the United
States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. There are two aspects to mootness, "when the
issues presented are no longer 'live' or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome." Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969).
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in In re Gross, 382 A.2d 116, 119 (Pa. 1978), fol-
lowed the federal doctrine of mootness by stating that an ."actual controversy must be ex-
tant at all stages of review."
In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the United States Supreme Court established an
exception to the mootness requirement. In that case, a woman sought a declaration that she
had a right to an abortion. Roe, 410 U.S. at 125. She was pregnant when she filed suit but
was no longer pregnant when the case reached the Supreme Court. Id. The Court stated
that if the case was held moot, then it would be denied appellate review because the issue
was "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Id. at 125 (citing Southern Pacific Terminal
Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)). See also Commonwealth v. Joint Bargaining Commit-
tee for the Pennsylvania Social Services Union, 398 A.2d 1001, 1002 (Pa. 1979).
15. 587 A.2d 699 (Pa. 1991). In Gulnac, petitioners sought to enjoin teachers from
striking and to have the act allowing them to strike be declared unconstitutional. Gulnac,
587 A.2d at 700. The common pleas court held that the parents lacked standing and then
declared the statute unconstitutional. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated the*
trial court's decision on the grounds that once the trial court held that the parents lacked
standing, then the issue of constitutionality became moot. Id.
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because the issue was moot. 6 The supreme court distinguished
Gulnac from the present case because, in Gulnac, the parents
lacked standing.
7
The Education Association next argued that the issue of the pro-
vision's constitutionality was moot because the school district and
the teachers had reached an agreement and the teachers had re-
turned to work.' The court found that the return of the teachers
to work should not bar the action. 9 The court concluded that the
suit involved a question which frequently recurred but had evaded
judicial review because districts and teachers often reach agree-
ments before the case can be fully heard.20
After deciding that the issue of constitutionality was not moot,
the court examined the analysis applied by the trial court to deter-
mine whether PERA was unconstitutional.2' The Plaintiffs argued
that the court should apply a strict scrutiny analysis,22 while the
Education Association argued that the court should apply a ra-
tional basis analysis. 23 The trial court used the rational basis anal-
16. Reichley, 626 A.2d at 125.
17. Id. The court noted that in Gulnac, the issue of the constitutionality was moot
because the trial court found that the parents lacked standing. Id. However, in this case, the
trial court found that the parents did have standing because the parents' interest was suffi-
ciently adverse to the teachers' interest to create a controversy that required judicial resolu-
tion. Id. at 126. Therefore, the Education Association could not rely on Gulnac for its con-
tention that the issue of the constitutionality of the act was moot. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. The court also found that the passage of Act 88 on July 9, 1992, during the
pendency of the appeal did not render the issue moot. Id. at 126 n.3. Act 88 removes teach-
ers from the scope of PERA and provides for collective bargaining in the Public School
Code. 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11-1101-A (Supp. 1993). If a strike would prevent the school
from -meeting its 180 school day requirement, then both parties must submit to arbitration.
24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11-1125-A(b) (Supp. 1993). However, arbitration is not binding because
either the teachers or the school district could reject it within ten days. 24 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 11-1125-A(k) (Supp. 1993). Teachers are still permitted to strike; the strike is merely sus-
pended during the period of arbitration. Reichley, 626 A.2d at 126 n.3. Consequently, the
issue of allowing public school teachers to strike still arises under Act 88. Id.
20. Id. See note 14 for discussion of the mootness doctrine and its exceptions.
21. Reichley, 626 A.2d at 126.
22. Under the strict scrutiny analysis, the statute must be rigidly construed to pro-
tect a compelling state interest. Reichley, 626 A.2d at 126.
The United States Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973), explained the strict scrutiny analysis and noted that where state
laws created suspect classifications or infringed upon constitutionally protected rights, so-
called "fundamental rights," then the state law must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.
San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 40.
23. Reichley, 626 A.2d at 126. Under a rational basis analysis, a statute is deemed to
be constitutional if it reasonably relates to a valid state interest. Id.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that this traditional standard of review re-
quires only that the state action be rationally related to a state's legitimate purpose. San
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ysis because the harm to the students outweighed any possible in-
terest the state might have in reducing labor tensions between
teachers and school districts.2 The supreme court, however, re-
jected both the rational basis test and the strict scrutiny test, stat-
ing that the use of these standards was limited to in equal protec-
tion cases. 5
The court noted that article III, section 14 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution ' 6 was drafted to allow future legislatures the ability to
modify any statute relating to education in order to adapt to
changing educational needs.2 For this reason, the court held that
the proper standard to be used was one which inquired into 1)
whether the statute was related to the objective of the constitu-
tional provision regardless of how the legislature attempted to ac-
complish the purpose and 2) whether the statute attempted to
limit the future employment of legislative power over the area of
public education. 8
The court then addressed the final issue of whether the Plain-
tiffs had met their burden of proof in establishing that PERA was
unconstitutional insofar as it allowed public school teachers to
strike.2 9 The court noted that in reaching the conclusion that
PERA was unconstitutional, the trial court had examined several
policy considerations."0 However, the supreme court found that
these considerations did not satisfy the heavy burden of showing
that PERA was unconstitutional." Furthermore, the supreme
Antonio, 411 U.S. at 40.
24. Reichley, 626 A.2d at 126.
25. Id. The supreme court stated that "the 'strict scrutiny'/'rational basis' framework
is not applicable to the question presented. This is not an equal protection case." Id. at 127.
26. Article III, section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that "[tihe Gen-
eral Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient
system of public education to serve the needs of the Commonwealth." PA. CONST. art. III,
§ 14.
27. Reichley, 626 A.2d at 126.
28. Id. at 128. The court also noted that proving a statute to be unconstitutional was
a strong burden to meet. Id. The court further stated that if there were any doubts as to a
statute's constitutionality, then the statute should be found to be constitutional. Id.
29. Id. at 128.
30. Id. The trial court found that strikes by teachers were disruptive to the educa-
tional process and were detrimental to the students in that students were disadvantaged
regarding college applications and employment opportunities. Id.
31. Id. The court noted that anyone challenging the constitutionality of a statute
bears the burden of demonstrating that the act " 'clearly, palpably, and plainly violates the
Constitution, and any doubts are to be resolved in favor of a finding of constitutionality'."
Id. (citing Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd. v. Spa Athletic Club, 485 A.2d 732, 735 (Pa.
1984)).
614 Vol. 32:611
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court stated that such policy considerations were for the legislature
to address, not for the courts to decide.
3 2
An examination of cases interpreting article III, section 14 of the
Pennsylvania Constitution is necessary in order to understand the
court's ruling in the present case. The forerunner of this section
was article X, section 1.1 The initial interpretation of this section
was adjudicated by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Malone
v. Hayden.34 This case involved the Teachers' Tenure Act of
1937.11 Various teachers who had been denied contracts under the
act initiated mandamus actions against the school boards to com-
pel the school boards to grant the teachers new contracts as re-
quired under the act.36 The school boards contested the writs on
the grounds that the Teachers' Tenure Act was unconstitutional.
3 7
The lower courts issued the writs of mandamus, requiring the
school boards to tender new contracts to the teachers.3 On appeal,
the supreme court addressed the issue of whether the Teachers'
Tenure Act violated article X, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution by restricting the ability of future legislatures to enact
laws necessary to carry out the function delegated to them by the
constitution. 3
32. Reichley, 626 A.2d at 129.
33. Article X, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1874 provided that: "The
General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient
system of public schools, wherein all children of this Commonwealth above the age of six
years may be educated, and shall appropriate at least one million dollars each year for that
purpose." PA. CONST. art. X, § 1 (1874), amended and renumbered by PA. CONST. art. III,
§ 14.
34. 197 A. 344 (Pa. 1938). This case is also commonly referred to as The Teachers'
Tenure Act Cases. See Reichley, 626 A.2d at 127.
35. Malone, 197 A. at 349. Section 1201 of the Teachers' Tenure Act provided in
pertinent part that: "The Board of Directors in every school district in this Commonwealth
shall employ the necessary qualified teachers to keep the public schools open in their re-
spective districts in compliance with the provisions of this act." Teachers' Tenure Act of
1937, 1937 Pa. Laws 214-15 (codified at 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11-1121 (1992)).
Section 1205 of the Teachers' Tenure Act provided in pertinent part that:
Each Board of School Directors or Board of public education in all school districts in
this Commonwealth shall, within thirty days after the effective date of this act, enter
into contract, in writing, with all professional employes now employed by them, and
thereafter shall in the same manner enter into contracts in writing, with each profes-
sional employe at or before the time the employe first enters the service of the
district.
Teachers' Tenure Act of 1937, 1937 Pa. Laws 214-15 (codified at 24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11-
1121 (1992)).
36. Malone, 197 A. at 351.
37. Id. at 352.
38. Id.
39. Id. See note 33 for text of article X, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.
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The supreme court stressed the importance of education, recog-
nizing that providing education was an essential government power
and obligation."' The court noted that education was a vital ele-
ment to the preservation of the state and democracy."1 Therefore,
the court stressed, power over education by the state could not be
weakened or ignored, and legislation which undermined the consti-
tutional mandate to provide for a "thorough and efficient system of
public schools" could not be tolerated. 2
The supreme court in Malone also set forth a standard for evalu-
ating laws which relate to public education. The Malone court
opined that a court should look not at the prudence or benefit of
the law, but whether it had a reasonable relation to the intention
expressed in article X, section 1 and whether the effect of the law
violated the constitutional provision by avoiding it or by prevent-
ing future legislatures from altering a law. ' The court held that
the purpose of this constitutional provision was to allow future leg-
islatures to adopt an evolving policy to adapt to advances in educa-
tion." The court stressed that anything related to the maintenance
of a "thorough and efficient system of public schools" must be sub-
ject to future legislative action.4 5 In applying the foregoing stan-
dard to the Teachers' Tenure Act, the court found that the act was
constitutional.46
Article. X, section 1 was amended and renumbered in 1968 by
article III, section 14.' One of the first cases decided after the
amendment was Bovino v. Board of School Directors of Indiana
Area School District.45 In Bovino, the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania addressed the issue of whether this new section ap-
plied to uphold a dismissal of a teacher for immoral conduct.49 Ap-
pellant, a tenured teacher, had been charged with making com-
ments to a fourteen-year old student.50 The school board dismissed
40. Id.





46. Malone, 197 A. at 353.
47. PA. CONST. art. III, § 14. The amendment did not alter the requirement that the
General Assembly provide a "thorough and efficient" system of public schools. Compare
note 33 to 26.
48. 377 A.2d 1284 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1977).
49. Bovino, 377 A.2d at 1289.
50. Id. at 1286. On one occasion, appellant called the student a "slut." Id. at 1287.
This incident was witnessed by another student. Id. On another occasion, appellant implied
Vol. 32:611
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appellant under section 11-1122 of the Public School Code of
1949.51 The board determined that the comments could be classi-
fied as "immoral" and "cruel" conduct which constituted grounds
for dismissal under section 11-1122.52
Appellant appealed his dismissal to the Secretary of Education,
who upheld the board's decision.53 Appellant then appealed to the
commonwealth court, contending that section 11-1122 was uncon-
stitutional on the grounds that the words "immoral" and "cruel"
were vague and indefinite.5' The commonwealth court rejected ap-
pellant's argument and held that the legislature can establish qual-
ifications for teachers with respect to their education and abilities
and also their moral characters in order to attain a "thorough and
efficient system" of public education.
55
Article III, section 14 was further interpreted in Danson v.
Casey,5 6 where the supreme court addressed the issue of whether a
legislatively enacted school financing scheme was constitutional.
to the student in class that she was a prostitute. Id. Other students present in the classroom
testified that the remarks were made. Id.
51. Id. Section 11-1122 of the Public School Code provided that:
The only valid causes for termination of a contract heretofore or hereafter entered
into with a professional employe shall be immorality, incompetency, intemperance,
cruelty, persistent negligence, mental derangement, advocation of or participation in
un-American or subversive doctrines, persistent and wilful violation of the school
laws of this Commonwealth on the part of the professional employee....
24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11-1122 (1992) (emphasis added).
52. Bovino, 377 A.2d at 1287.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1288. "Immorality" was defined by the supreme court for purpose of the
code as "not essentially confined to a deviation from sex morality; it may be such a course of
conduct as offends the morals of the community and is a bad example to the youth whose
ideals a teacher is supposed to foster and to elevate." Horosko v. Mount Pleasant Township
Sch. Dist., 6 A.2d 866, 868 (Pa. 1939), cert. denied sub nom. Horosko v. School Dist. of
Township of Mount Pleasant, 308 U.S. 553 (1939).
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania suggested the following definition of "cruelty"
for purpose of the code: "the intentional and malicious infliction of physical suffering upon
living creatures, particularly human beings; or, as applied to the latter, the wanton, mali-
cious, and unnecessary infliction of pain upon the body, or the feelings and emotions; abu-
sive treatment; inhumanity; outrage." Caffas v. Board of Sch. Directors of Upper Dauphin
Area Sch. Dist., 353 A.2d 898, 900 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY
541 (4th ed. 1968)).
55. Bovino, 377 A.2d at 1289.
56. 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979).
57. Danson, 399 A.2d at 362. The statutory scheme through which public schools in
Pennsylvania were financed created funding through state subsidies and local taxation. Id.
At issue in Danson were the subsidies. Id. Subsidies were distributed by the State Treasurer
and the State Secretary of Education. Id. For each child enrolled in a school district, that
district was eligible to receive a "percentage of the median statewide actual instructional
expense per student." Id. This percentage was calculated "by dividing the market value of
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In Danson, the School District of Philadelphia and various parents
filed suit alleging that because the district had insufficient reve-
nues, the statutory financing scheme through which the district
was funded violated article III, section 14 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution."
The district sought a decree restraining the State Treasurer and
Secretary of Education from paying money to any other school dis-
trict until sufficient funds were made available to the School Dis-
trict of Philadelphia."9 The commonwealth court dismissed the ac-
tion on the grounds that the appellants had failed to state a cause
of action and that the district did not have standing.60
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the dismissal but
addressed the constitutional challenge. 1 The court rejected the
idea that educational offerings to students in the commonwealth
should be uniform or that each student should receive the same
monetary expenditures.2 On the contrary, the court declared that
article III, section 14 prevented the court from binding future leg-
islatures and school boards to a current interpretation of what a
normal education entails." Thus, the court concluded that article
III, section 14 was not violated by the statutory financing scheme."
In searching for the proper role of a "thorough and efficient sys-
tem of public education," the commonwealth court in Lisa H. v.
State Board of Education"6 rejected the claim that article III, sec-
tion 14 gave each student an individual right to a certain quality of
education.6 6 In this case, two elementary school students were eval-
the district's real estate and its personal income tax bases by the district's students and
comparing it to the state average real estate and income tax bases per student." Id. "If the
district tax base and the state tax base [were] equal, the district receive[d] fifty percent of
actual or median student cost, whichever [was] lower." Id. This was a basic instructional
subsidy which was supplemented by payments for each student on welfare. Id. at 363-64.
58. Danson, 399 A.2d at 362. The district contended that it would have had to offer
its students limited services due to the insufficient funding. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 363.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 367. The court stated that when the "thorough and efficient" amendment
to the Pennsylvania Constitution was adopted in 1873, the framers did consider requiring
that the system of education offered in Pennsylvania be uniform. Id. However, they rejected
this idea and adopted the concept of local control so that the different needs of each school
district could be addressed. Id.
63. Danson, 399 A.2d at 366.
64. Id.
65. 447 A.2d 669 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982), a/I'd, 467 A.2d 1127 (Pa. 1983).
66. Lisa H., 447 A.2d at 673.
Vol. 32:611
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uated for participation in a gifted student education program .
Neither student was selected to participate in the program and
their parents filed suit, alleging that the section of the State Board
of Education Regulations defining gifted students' s and sections of
the code relating to gifted children' 9 were unconstitutional.7 0 The
grounds for the suit were that the program excluded the students
from available education and provided the students with an educa-
tion inferior to that of students in the program.71
The commonwealth court, citing Danson, 2 noted that article III,
section 14 did not require that education offered be uniform.7 3
Therefore, the court noted that a legislative system which only re-
quired individualized training and education for those students
who deviate from the norm was one which was reasonably related
to providing a "thorough and efficient system of [public] educa-
tion. ' 74 The court found that students in Pennsylvania had a right
to public education, but did not have a right to a particular level or
quality of education, except in the case of exceptional children,
75
and therefore, the regulations and code sections were not
unconstitutional.
76
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania further interpreted article
III, section 14 in School District of Philadelphia v. Twer,7 ad-
67. Id. at 671.
68. Gifted and talented children were defined under the State Board of Education
Regulations as "[tihose who, in accordance with criteria prescribed in standards developed
by the Secretary of Education, have outstanding intellectual or creative ability, the develop-
ment of which requires special activities or services not ordinarily provided to regular chil-
dren by local educational agencies." Lisa H., 447 A.2d at 671 n.2. (citing 22 PA. CODE
§ 13.1() (reserved 1990, replaced with 22 PA. CODE ch. 14, 20 Pa. Bull. 3339, June 15,
1990)).
69. Lisa H., 447 A.2d at 671 n.3. (citing 22 PA. CODE §§ 13.21, 13.22, 13.23, 13.31,
13.32, 13.33, 341.1(iv) and 341.1(x) (reserved 1990, replaced with 22 PA. CODE ch. 14, 20 Pa.
Bull. 3339, June 15, 1990)).
70. Lisa H., 447 A.2d at 671.
71. Id.
72. Danson v. Casey, 399 A.2d 360 (Pa. 1979). See notes 56-64 and accompanying
text.
73. Lisa H., 447 A.2d at 673.
74. Id. The Lisa H. court utilized the standard set forth in Malone, that a legislative
enactment regarding education must have a reasonable relation to the purpose expressed in
the constitution. Id.
75. Id. A school district is not required to devise a scheme of education which best
utilizes each child's abilities and talents, but is only required to identify which children are
exceptional and to design programs which serve the child's individual needs. Id. (citing
Shanberg v. Secretary of Educ., 426 A.2d 232 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981)).
76. Lisa H., 447 A.2d at 673.
77. 447 A.2d 222 (Pa. 1982).
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 32:611
dressing the issue of whether the section applied to prevent demo-
tions of employees caused by financial constraints.78 In Twer, the
school district adopted a reduced budget which required that 240
employees of the school district be demoted to reduce expendi-
tures.79 The employees appealed their demotions to the Secretary
of Education, who determined that the demotions violated sections
11-1151 and 11-1127 of the Public School Code of 1949.80 The
school district appealed the Secretary's decision to the common-
wealth court, which affirmed the Secretary's finding.81 The district
subsequently appealed to the supreme court.82
In holding that the demotions were permissible under article III,
section 14, the supreme court noted that the school district faced
the dilemma of having a deficit and being required to balance its
budget.s The court stressed, however, that the financial problems
faced by the school district could not interfere with its primary
responsibility to maintain "a thorough and efficient system of pub-
lic education."8 The court stated that although the application of
this concept should have been obvious, it required reinforcement
due to the ongoing labor disputes and other disruptions occurring
in public education.8 5 The court emphasized that maintenance of a
78. Twer, 447 A.2d at 223.
79. Id.
80. Id. Section 11-1151 of the School Code provides in pertinent part that:
[T]here shall be no demotion of any professional employe either in salary or in type
-of position, except as otherwise provided in this act, without the consent of the em-
ploye, or, if such consent is not received, then such demotion shall be subject to the
right to a hearing before the board of school directors and an appeal in the same
manner as hereinbefore provided in the case of the dismissal of a professional
employe.
24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11-1151 (1992).
Section 11-1127 of the School Code provides:
Before any professional employe having attained a status of permanent tenure is dis-
missed by the board of school directors, such board of school directors shall furnish
such professional employe with a detailed written statement of the charges upon
which his or her proposed dismissal is based and shall conduct a hearing. A written
notice signed by the president and attested by the secretary of the board of directors
shall be forwarded by registered mail to the professional employe setting forth the
tine and place when and where such professional employe will be given an opportu-
nity to be heard either in person or by counsel, or both, before the board of school
directors and setting forth a detailed statement of the charges. Such hearing shall not
be sooner than ten (10) days nor later than fifteen (15) days after such written notice.
24 PA. CONS. STAT. § 11-1127 (1992).
81. Twer, 447 A.2d at 223.
82. Id.





public school system was for the education of the students, and
financial benefits to those participating in the school system were
only incidental to this primary goal.8 6 Therefore, any examination
of a legislative act relating to public education must be made in
reference to the responsibility to provide for a "thorough and effi-
cient system of public education.
8 7
This concept of a "thorough and efficient system of public edu-
cation" was further applied in Agostine v. School District of Phila-
delphia"s by the commonwealth court to address the issue of
whether a learning disabled student was entitled to a particular
level of education. 9 In Agostine, a student was placed in a class for
the educable mentally retarded ° when in fact, she was only learn-
ing disabled.9 The student brought an action for negligence
against the school district on the grounds that she was denied her
86. Twer, 447 A.2d at 224.
87. Id. at 225.
88. 527 A.2d 193 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1987).
89. Agostine, 527 A.2d at 195.
90. Educable mentally retarded is defined under the Public School Code as:
Mentally retarded-Impaired mental development which adversely affects the educa-
tional performance of a person. A mentally retarded person exhibits significantly im-
paired adaptive behavior in learning, maturation, or social adjustment as a result of
subaverage intellectual functioning. The degree of retardation and the level of social
and academic functioning, not deviant behavior patterns, shall be the factors in de-
termining the individualized program. A person shall be assigned to a program for the
mentally retarded when the evaluation and Individualized Education Program indi-
cate that such a program is appropriate; provided that no person shall be assigned to
a program for the. . . educable mentally retarded unless the IQ score of the person is
lower than 80.
Agostine, 527 A.2d at 194 n.1 (citing 22 PA. CODE § 341.1(v) (reserved 1990, replaced with
22 PA. CODE ch. 342, 20 Pa. Bull. 3357, June 15, 1990)).
91. Agostine, 527 A.2d at 194. A learning disability is defined under the Public
School Code as:
A deficiency in the acquisition of basic learning skills, including but not limited to the
ability to reason, think, read, write, spell, or do mathematical calculations, as identi-
fied by an educational and psychological evaluation. Persons who have learning disor-
ders which are primarily the result of visual, hearing, or other handicaps, mental re-
tardation, emotional factors, or environmental disadvantage are not learning disabled.
The term learning disabled does not exclude the possibility that a learning disabled
person may also exhibit such conditions as brain damage or minimal brain disfunc-
tion. A person shall be assigned to a program for the learning disabled when the
evaluation and Individualized Education Program indicate that such a program is
appropriate. provided that the evaluation clearly indicates that the person can
demonstrate average or above average intellectual functioning on an appropriate in-
telligence measure. The evaluation shall include an assessment of specific academic
strengths and weaknesses.
Agostine, 527 A.2d at 194 n.3 (citing 22 PA. CODE § 341.1(iii) (reserved 1990, replaced with
22 PA. CODE ch. 342, 20 Pa. Bull. 3357, June 15, 1990)).
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right to receive the education to which she was entitled under the
Pennsylvania Constitution.2 The school district moved for a judg-
ment on the pleadings.9 3 The court of common pleas found in favor
of the school district, and the student appealed. 4
In affirming the common pleas court decision, the common-
wealth court noted that the mandate of article III, section 14 did
not guarantee an individual right to each student to a particular
level or quality of education. 5 The court stated that the mandate
imposed upon the legislature a duty to provide for the "mainte-
nance and support of a thorough and efficient system of public ed-
ucation." 96 Since the legislature had delegated to the Department
of Education the duty to adopt educational standards, the court
concluded that the recovery for injury occurring from education
was statutory in nature."
The foregoing analysis of cases interpreting the General Assem-
bly's duty to provide for a "thorough and efficient system of public
education" indicates that Pennsylvania courts have been consis-
tent in their interpretations of the effect of this mandate. The duty
of the General Assembly to provide for a "thorough and efficient
system of public education" cannot be impeded by any enactment
of legislation which is not capable of changing to meet the consist-
ently developing needs of the educational system. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in Reichley was consistent with the holdings
of the other Cases in failing to find a violation of article III, section
14. However, the analysis applied by the court appears to be a
rather loose and liberal one. It is difficult to imagine any statute
which would violate this section as interpreted by the Pennsylva-
nia courts.
The court in Reichley developed what is essentially a new test
that is to be applied in situations involving the constitutionality of
statutes relating to education not involving an equal protection is-
sue. 8 The court further noted that while its new test did inquire
into whether the statute has a reasonable relation to the purpose
of article III, section 14, this test is not the same as the rational
92. Agostine, 527 A.2d at 194.
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relationship test applicable in equal protection cases.9 Although
this analysis by the court may appear perplexing, the court was
correct in not applying the strict scrutiny or rational basis test.
The Plaintiffs in this case did not allege that they were being de-
nied equal protection under the law or that their substantive due
process rights were being violated. 100 If they had argued on either
of these grounds, then the trial court would have been correct in
applying the rational basis test. However, the Plaintiffs alleged
that their right to receive an education, as guaranteed by article
III, section 14, was being violated because the strike prevented
them from receiving their mandated education.10 1 The trial court
applied the rational basis test and examined whether the statute
was reasonably related to a legitimate state interest. 10 2 The trial
court found that the harm to the students outweighed any possible
interest which the state might have in reducing labor tensions be-
tween teachers and the school districts. 08 In fact, the lower court
noted that labor tensions did not decrease but, on the contrary,
that confrontations arose which did not aid in settlement of dis-
putes.10' Therefore, the court of common pleas found that there
was no reasonable relationship between the statute and a legiti-
mate state interest and so held that the statute was
unconstitutional.
0 5
Although the supreme court set forth a test to determine if a
statute relating to education is unconstitutional, it did not analyze
PERA using the standard or remand the case back to the trial
court for application of the standard by the trial court. If the court
had analyzed PERA using the two-pronged test which it set forth,
it may have found that the statute did not meet the test.
The first leg of the test is that the statute must be related to the
objective of the constitutional provision regardless of how the leg-
islature attempted to accomplish the purpose.106 With regard to
PERA, this would mean that allowing teachers to strike would be
related to the mandate of providing for a "thorough and efficient
system of education." In this case, there does not seem to be such
99. Id.
100. Reichley v. North Penn Sch. Dist., 126 Montg. Co. L. R. 52, 53 (1990).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 62.
103. Id. at 63.
104. Id.
105. Reichley, 126 Montg. Co. L. R. at 63.
106. Reichley, 626 A.2d at 128.
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a relation. In fact, allowing teachers to strike hinders a "thorough
and efficient system of education" for various reasons. Strikes are
disruptive to the educational process. 107 Strikes injure students by
placing them at a disadvantage in regard to athletics, education,
college applications, and employment opportunities. 10 8 Strikes also
foster an animosity between the teachers and students which does
not cease when the strikes are over. 09 All of the above considera-
tions seem to negate any advantage which may occur out of al-
lowing teachers to strike. Pennsylvania teachers strike more than
teachers in any other state, but have not fared any better in the
collective bargaining process than their counterparts in other
states."'
The second leg of the test is whether the statute attempted to
limit future legislation over the area of public education."1 This is
the part of the standard which few statutes would fail. Any statute
can be repealed and changed by the legislature. Therefore, this leg
should not be determinative of the constitutionality of a statute
relating to education.
The problem of teachers' strikes is one of vital concern to all
citizens. It affects teachers, students, parents, and the community
at large. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, instead of address-
ing the issue head-on, skirted around the issue and avoided re-
sponsibility by stating that the legislature should address the is-
sue." 2 This would be acceptable if there were no issue of
constitutionality present. However, the prevalence and impact of
teachers' strikes indicates that these strikes may indeed interfere
with the requirement of a "thorough and efficient system of public
education."'1 3 Strikes adversely affect the students and the teach-
ers, and do not put teachers in a better bargaining position. " One
need only watch the news each fall to learn of new strikes and see
that the bitterness and resentment created on both sides only
hampers the educational process. Strikes may eventually end, but
the emotions and turmoil created by the strikes endure.
Therefore, considering the prevalence of teachers strikes in the
107. Reichley, 126 Montg. Co. L. R. at 54-56.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 57-58.
110. Id. at 66-67.
111. Reichley, 626 A.2d at 128.
112. Id. at 129.




Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,1 5 the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania will probably again be confronted with this same issue. The
court in the future should address the issue with more than the
cursory inspection that was granted in the Reichley case.
Danielle M. Wagner
115. Id.
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